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In the article, I am concerned with the epistemic justifi cation of de-
mocracy: what does the epistemic justifi cation of democracy consist of, 
and how can we assure that democracy indeed generates decisions of 
the highest epistemic quality? However, since it is impossible to speak 
about the epistemic justifi cation of democracy without considering its 
relation to political justifi cation, and their tension, this article will also 
question the relationship between epistemic and political justifi cation. 
I endorse a position called the hybrid stance, not only because I think 
that, when justifying democracy, we need to consider both the political 
value of fairness and the epistemic values of truth-sensitivity and truth-
conduciveness, but because I believe we should appropriately harmonize 
them. While the advocates of epistemic proceduralism hold that it best 
harmonizes the political and epistemic values of democracy, I argue that 
they do not separate epistemic values as intrinsically different from the 
political. On the other hand, even if we accept that epistemic justifi cation 
is tied to intrinsically truth-respecting practices, the question remains 
which decision-making processes best satisfy this demand. In simpler 
terms, we must inquire how to divide epistemic labor between citizens 
and experts. I will try to show that the optimal model needs to preserve 
both the epistemic potential of the diversity present in the collective intel-
ligence of citizens, and the epistemic potential of the factual knowledge 
embodied by the individual intelligence of experts.
Keywords: Epistemic justifi cation of democracy, epistemic proce-
duralism, division of epistemic labor, experts, epistemic diversity.
1. Introduction
In my book, Democracy and Truth, my central claim was that democ-
racy’s legitimacy stems not only from its political but from its epistemic 
justifi cation. In simpler terms, democracy is as good and as desirable a 
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political system as it is fair—meaning, as much as it supports the free-
dom and equality of every citizen, but also as much as it generates deci-
sions of high epistemic quality (that is, decisions that solve the citizen’s 
problems, evidence-based decisions, decisions that are the consequence 
of epistemically responsible conduct or, more succinct, decisions that 
are truth-conducive or truth-sensitive).
It is not entirely simple to offer a specifi c and concise explanation of 
what it means for democracy—a system of procedures, practices, and 
institutions—to be epistemically justifi ed or to generate epistemically 
valuable decisions. Truth has traditionally been the foundational epis-
temic value. However, since truth is something we attribute to proposi-
tions, it is not entirely appropriate for assessing (collective) epistemic 
agency. If we are looking to offer an epistemic appraisal of systems, 
practices, and procedures, we will need to utilize new standards 
of epistemic evaluation. In this sense, I have chosen to speak about 
the epistemic features of a system whose decisions solve its citizens’ 
problems, or, more precisely, about epistemically virtuous practices, 
procedures, and institutions that generate truth-conductive or truth-
sensitive, evidence-based beliefs/stances/decisions. If democracy, as a 
system, manages to solve its citizens’ problems and creates decisions 
that are—because they are made through scientifi c methods such as 
critical thinking, deliberation, argumentation, epistemically virtuous 
disagreement resolution or like—correct and accurate, then we can say 
democracy possesses the epistemic feature of being a truth-conducive 
and truth-sensitive system.
Democracy is undoubtedly the best existing system when it comes 
to the political value of fairness. Still, it seems that, even though it sat-
isfi es the demand for fairness, it frequently produces decisions of low 
epistemic quality. These decisions are not only inadequate for citizens 
because they do not answer their problems. They also inspire disagree-
ment through social divisions, exclusion, radicalism, and terrorism; 
they generate decisions detrimental to the quality of life, health, edu-
cation, and survival of their citizens and make the citizens’ lives mis-
erable by deepening social inequalities. It could be claimed, of course, 
that only an unfair system that just appears democratic will generate 
decisions of low epistemic quality. Apart from the option that an only 
ostensibly democratic system could be both politically and epistemi-
cally unjustifi ed, research has shown that even fair democratic pro-
cedures—such as majority voting, representative democracies that in-
clude debates between party representatives, referendums, and public 
forums—often generate decisions and beliefs of low epistemic quality. 
It is always possible for some fair practice to produce a low-quality 
decision owing to particular circumstances or the quality of the citi-
zens’ contribution. However, recent social phenomena imply there is 
no reason to think that some procedure—a procedure that is politically 
justifi ed because it includes all citizens as free and equal—will, as if 
through an invisible hand, generate decisions of high epistemic quality. 
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There is nothing in the very nature of fair procedures, no relevant epis-
temic feature of such methods by themselves, that would guarantee the 
truth-conduciveness of its decisions (Goldman 2010).
In my book, I have attempted to show there is an intrinsic tension 
between the political value of fairness on the one hand and the epis-
temic value of truth-sensitivity on the other. Even Ancient thinkers, 
most prominently Plato, have emphasized that including all citizens 
in the decision-making process will not generate decisions of the high-
est epistemic quality. Plato’s kallipolis is nothing else but a proposal 
that, to preserve the epistemic quality of decisions, we should sacrifi ce 
the political values of equality and freedom: simpler, he pleaded for 
the epistemic virtues of epistocracy. The tenacity of this confl ict is also 
visible in other practices, such as the different forms of epistemic pa-
ternalism and programs of affi rmative action I write about in my book. 
Most political philosophers, aiming to avoid the thorny question of the 
non-democratic character of the practices that best promote epistemic 
quality, have purposely omitted the epistemic status of democracy, cen-
tering only on its political justifi cation. Contrary to epistocracy and all 
kinds of elitism, I assume that a desirable political system must surely 
be politically justifi ed and fair. Nevertheless, it also needs to be epis-
temically justifi ed.
In this article, I deal specifi cally with the epistemic justifi cation of 
democracy: what does the epistemic justifi cation of democracy consist 
of, and how do we assure that democracy indeed generates decisions of 
the highest epistemic quality? However, since it is impossible to speak 
about the epistemic justifi cation of democracy without considering its 
relation to political justifi cation and their tension, this article will also 
question the relationship between epistemic and political justifi cation. 
I endorse a position called the hybrid stance, not only because I think 
that, when justifying democracy, we need to consider both the politi-
cal value of fairness and the epistemic values of truth-sensitivity and 
truth-conduciveness, but because I believe we should appropriately 
harmonize them. In that sense, political instrumentalism, the stance 
that we should prioritize political values, while epistemic values are 
only secondary or derived from the political, is as unacceptable as epis-
temic instrumentalism, the view we should prioritize epistemic values 
while sacrifi cing and forgoing the political.
***
In my discussion about the epistemic justifi cation of democracy, I 
will rely on the arguments authored by Ivan Mladenović and Nenad 
Miščević, both of whose articles analyze the nature of the epistemic 
in democracy. Ivan Mladenović raises the question of what demands a 
democratic system must satisfy, apart from its political rationale, to be 
considered epistemically justifi ed. Nenad Miščević, assuming that epis-
temic justifi cation is tied to truth-respecting practices, wonders which 
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decision-making processes best satisfy this demand. Even though their 
articles abound in arguments and solutions that entail a value inde-
pendent from their debate about my book, I will focus on their central 
claims related to the epistemic justifi cation of democracy.
2. Epistemic value: is it intrinsic 
or derived from political value?
In his article Ivan Mladenović (Mladenović 2020) endorses the stance 
of epistemic proceduralism, which, as he claims, best harmonizes epis-
temic and political justifi cation. Epistemic proceduralism, as developed 
by David Estlund and Fabienne Peter, is a standpoint deserving of our 
maximum attention, primarily because it was these philosophers who 
fi rst tackled the epistemic justifi cation of democracy (Estlund 2008a, 
2008b, Peter 2008, 2013). In my book, I have tried to show that, despite 
their pioneering efforts, their positions do not acknowledge epistemic 
justifi cation. Instead, they either derive it from or reduce it to political 
justifi cation, which is why I describe them as political instrumentalists.
I claim that Peter’s pure epistemic proceduralism, the position that 
there are no procedure-independent standards of epistemic justifi ca-
tion, ultimately reduces epistemic justifi cation to the political, assum-
ing that fair and inclusive procedures will by themselves generate 
epistemic quality. Moreover, Peter claims that, in the context of the 
epistemic justifi cation of democracy, we can only understand epistemic 
quality as the outcome of fair procedures. Estlund is somewhat more 
moderate, which is why I call his version moderate epistemic proce-
duralism. Although he does concede there are procedure-independent 
standards, he assumes the fi nal stance that fair democratic procedures 
tend to generate correct or epistemically valuable decisions—which is 
why independent standards appear only as a welcome supplement for 
particular situations. In any case, Estlund does not have to establish 
truth-conducive standards separate from fair procedures because he 
believes that democratic processes inherently contain enough reliabil-
ity to produce correct outcomes.
We can interpret his ambiguous attitude towards independent epis-
temic norms as a worry that independent epistemic criteria could im-
peril the fairness of democratic procedures. Estlund is probably one of 
the best contemporary critics of epistocracy, and we can understand his 
fi nal position about epistemic justifi cation as the stance that setting an 
independent truth-conducive standard could give rise to epistocracy. I 
believe that Estlund is right to choose this tactic. Namely, establishing 
separate epistemic standards indeed raises the question of the confl ict 
and the balance between political and epistemic values—where an inde-
pendent epistemic perspective forms new demands for democratic pro-
cedures. However, if we genuinely want to endorse the epistemic justifi -
cation of democracy, we will need to tackle the question of resolving the 
tension between political and epistemic criteria. The tactic of minimiz-
 S. Prijić-Samaržija, The Epistemic Justifi cation of Democracy 187
ing those epistemic standards for evaluating democratic decision-mak-
ing processes that are independent of political values is not appropriate 
for dedicated advocates of the epistemic justifi cation of democracy.
Contrary to my stance, Mladenović holds that Estlund’s epistemic 
proceduralism best harmonizes the political and epistemic values of 
democracy, and that epistemic proceduralism is an example of a hy-
brid perspective. As I have already said, while it is vital to support 
the inclusion of epistemic justifi cation alongside the political, it does 
not satisfy my understanding of a hybrid approach. Any proper hybrid 
approach assumes that each value bears an equal independent weight 
in the evaluation, and strives for an optimum balance of intrinsically 
different values that occasionally come into confl ict. First, both in Peter 
and in Estlund, epistemic quality, or a reliable record of generating 
correct decisions, is derived from fair procedures. Second, there is no 
confl ict between these values because any divergence is eliminated by 
the assumption that epistemic value can be inferred from the political.
Both for Peter and Estlund, there is no objective epistemic value (the 
epistemic feature of truth-conduciveness) that would be the necessary 
presumption of any intrinsically epistemic justifi cation. For both epis-
temic proceduralists, epistemic value is a consequence of politically ap-
propriately organized and conducted procedures. While Peter endorses 
the stance that fair processes will certainly generate epistemic quality, 
Estlund holds that fair procedures only tend to produce correct deci-
sions. Although it is not entirely clear what “correct” is supposed to 
mean, the concept resembles Rousseau’s correctness theory, where a 
“correct” decision is one that is supported by the general will. Therefore, 
a correct attitude is the one that is supported by the majority through 
fair democratic procedures and is unrelated to objective epistemic value. 
Fair procedures alone, independent from the informed and non-egoisti-
cal stance of those participating in the discussion, possess no epistemic 
feature that would guarantee epistemic quality. When Estlund and 
Mladenović claim that adequate democratic procedures tend to gener-
ate correct decisions, they are both telling us that they do not perceive 
epistemic values as separate and intrinsically different from the politi-
cal. And this is my main point of confl ict with epistemic proceduralism: I 
hold that epistemic value is objective and inherently different from how 
it is defi ned by various forms of social constructivism—which upturns 
the concept of truth by relativizing and annulling its objective value, or 
by considering it a product of (good) political processes.
Although he does not endorse Peter’s pure epistemic proceduralism, 
Mladenović notes that I erroneously equate her pure epistemic proce-
duralism with mere fair proceduralism, as Peter advocates precisely for 
epistemic proceduralism. In contrast, real fair proceduralism is utterly 
insensitive to epistemic justifi cation. Likewise, he holds that I wrongly 
neglect the fact Estlund does understand the importance of procedure-
independent standards. I repeat that both Estlund and Peter have done 
a pioneering job in tackling the question of epistemic justifi cation. Before 
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them, political philosophers have ignored, purposely disregarded, or ex-
plicitly refused the issue of the epistemic value of democracy. However, 
once Estlund and Peter have put this question on the table and opened 
this signifi cant philosophical debate, we must ask whether they cor-
rectly understood the nature of epistemic justifi cation. Pure epistemic 
proceduralism, precisely because of its utter reduction of epistemic jus-
tifi cation to the political, is essentially no different from that procedur-
alism that deals only with the political values of democratic procedures. 
Fair proceduralism and pure epistemic proceduralism are not entirely 
equal because Peter emphasizes the signifi cance of epistemic justifi ca-
tion, but their fi nal evaluations are very much alike: everything comes 
down to assessing and improving the political value of procedures. To 
make myself clear, while I do believe that the political value of processes 
is signifi cant, it is not suffi cient for justifying democracy.
In his version of (moderate) epistemic proceduralism, Estlund claims 
that epistemic justifi cation must possess independent standards, only 
to end with the conclusion that it is acceptable for democratic proce-
dures not to generate truth in some particular case as long as they, in 
general, produce correct decisions. Mladenović, echoing Estlund, claims 
that establishing truth as a procedure-independent standard that must 
always be met is not necessary and that my criterion of epistemic jus-
tifi cation is both redundant and overly ambitious. “It is reasonable to 
suppose that what Estlund terms ‘primary bads’ such as war, famine, 
economic collapse, genocide, belong to this class of procedure-indepen-
dent standards,” he writes, and continues “Consequently, for justifi ca-
tion of democracy and democratic authority, truth doesn’t need to be 
the only relevant epistemic standard. It is more reasonable to assume 
that for justifi cation of democracy, some other procedure-independent 
standards should have their epistemic signifi cance and that democratic 
decision-making given its inherently epistemic characteristics should 
provide reasons for action or reasons to comply” (Mladenović 2020). It 
is evident that the critical difference between epistemic proceduralism 
and my stance, which I call reliability democracy, is in how I under-
stand the nature of epistemic justifi cation. While I see epistemic justi-
fi cation as an intrinsic feature independent from political justifi cation 
and use this defi nition in establishing procedure-independent epis-
temic standards, Estlund and Mladenović do not consider this neces-
sary. While I believe that the epistemic justifi cation of democracy must 
rest on objective epistemic value or quality, they seek epistemic value 
in the constructs of fair political procedures or, in particular cases, in 
some political/ethical values, such as “the elimination of primary bads,” 
independent from what processes can generate.
Mladenović’s concept of reasonable agreement or acceptance, which 
he proposes as a suitable replacement for my outmoded insistence on 
truth, is undoubtedly a signifi cant political value that ensures society’s 
basic functioning in times of disagreement. However, for epistemic 
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justifi cation, what we need is truth-conducive agreement. We can also 
attain reasonable agreement around beliefs that are not true, and in 
procedures that are not (suffi ciently) truth-conducive. There is nothing 
in the nature of fair processes, the general will, and reasonable agree-
ment, that would imply they necessarily possess the epistemic feature 
of truth-conduciveness. In ideal epistemic circumstances of informed 
and epistemically responsible citizens who do not dogmatically hold on 
to their original stance, reasonable agreement could enjoy the feature 
of truth-conduciveness. However, real epistemic cases are sub-ideal. 
People are often both inadequately informed and unmotivated to form 
true beliefs and are subject to biases and prejudice created in closed in-
formational bubbles and echo chambers. In such conditions, reasonable 
agreement does not have the potential to be truth-conductive.
3. The division of epistemic labor 
between citizens and experts
In his article “The Limits of Expertism,” Nenad Miščević embraces—or, 
to be precise, does not even raise—the question of the epistemic justi-
fi cation of democracy, assuming that the legitimacy of democratic pro-
cesses and practices must depend on the epistemic quality of their deci-
sions. Miščević unambiguously accepts the stance that the epistemic 
quality of decisions and beliefs is closely tied to the epistemic value of 
truth. He also agrees that the epistemic virtues of some social practice, 
procedure, or institution, are intimately related to generating true be-
liefs, i.e., decisions based on true premises. Miščević correctly labels his 
and my position by calling us “truth-respecting theoreticians.” From 
our agreement on this matter, I derive an understanding that Miščević 
does not even mention, and which is related to my previous discussion 
about the position of epistemic proceduralism. Since epistemic proce-
duralism rejects the procedure-independent and intrinsic standard of 
truth as the criterion of epistemic legitimacy, I assume that he would, 
like I have done, develop a critical stance towards epistemic procedur-
alism of any kind. Namely, his article makes it clear that the epistemic 
quality of democratic procedures is not ensured simply by making them 
fair, but that there is some external, procedure-independent, and objec-
tive criterion for assessing the epistemic quality of decisions.
Miščević focuses on the question of how to organize democratic pro-
cedures to yield the highest epistemic quality or to attain the value of 
truth. He seems to accept that this question demands we assess the 
role of experts in democratic deliberation and decision-making, as they 
are, as individual epistemic agents, the best guides to the truth—i.e., 
they are the most truth-conducive epistemic agents. My book devotes 
a lot of attention precisely to the role of experts. Contrary to epistemic 
proceduralists, who perceive any inclusion of experts in decision-mak-
ing processes as a threat of unfair privileging or epistocracy, my model 
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of reliability democracy attempts to show that the expert participation 
in the democratic decision-making process improves the reliability of 
procedures, and, in turn, the epistemic quality of the fi nal decisions. 
However, the critical question is how to divide epistemic labor between 
citizens and experts without stripping procedures of their political jus-
tifi cation (Christiano 2012). For epistemic proceduralists, this question 
is meaningless, as they use different methods to shun this possibility as 
both politically harmful and epistemically ineffi cient. While Miščević, 
on the other hand, agrees with my proposal to include experts to make 
the fi nal decisions/beliefs/judgments more epistemically valuable, he 
suggests a different division of labor between citizens and experts. I 
will try to show that his model of the division of labor leaves less space 
to citizens, and is, thus, more expertist than my suggestion. I hold that, 
as such, he argues in favor of some kind of epistemic instrumentalism 
because he sacrifi ces political justifi cation for epistemic values, while 
barely adding anything new to epistemic quality.
Miščević correctly interprets my stance that consensualism would 
be the ideal decision-making practice were we to live in ideal circum-
stances that satisfy the epistemic preconditions for participating in 
public deliberation. In other words, democratic deliberation and dem-
ocratic procedures would have complete epistemic legitimacy if they, 
as processes, possessed the relevant epistemic features that made 
them reliable. In other words, participants in a debate should be (i) 
adequately informed about the topic they are discussing, which can 
be labeled the condition of adequately informed participants, and (ii) 
they must not be egoistically or emotionally tied to their stance in such 
a manner that they will immediately reject any opposing view, which 
we can call the anti-dogmatic condition for participants (Kitcher 2011, 
Lehrer and Wagner 1981). However, as it is unrealistic to assume that 
everyday democratic decision-making and voting procedures will meet 
these demands—which has been proven by ample empirical evidence—
the fulfi llment of these conditions can be considered an ideal scenario 
(Ahlstrom-Vij 2012, 2013, Sustain 2006). In ideal circumstances, demo-
cratic procedures and the resulting consensus would generate epistem-
ically valuable decisions.
Nonetheless, in real or sub-ideal cases, people are usually inade-
quately informed about some of or all the topics they are deciding about, 
they have seldom been taught to absorb the detailed data needed for 
making decisions, are not motivated to form beliefs of high epistemic 
quality correctly, and do not have the time to do thorough research 
(Goldman 1991). What is more, in everyday decision-making processes, 
citizens are pliant to many biases, stereotypes, and prejudice, which 
they are (sometimes) unaware of and which they (voluntarily or auto-
matically) do not control, which casts serious doubt on the condition 
of adequately informed participants, as well as on the anti-dogmatic 
condition for participants (Dunning and Kruger 1999, Fricker 2007). 
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There is also a myriad of structural social limitations in transmitting 
and fi ltering knowledge, and in communicating in a globalized world 
that relies on social networks, the Internet, and non-transparent algo-
rithms for selecting and disseminating information, which leads most 
of us to live within echo chambers. Such a non-ideal conversational con-
text for fulfi lling the conditions of adequate knowledge and openness 
necessarily thwarts the epistemic quality of the decisions generated 
through fair democratic procedures. And fi nally, democratic decision-
making itself—or the famous “wisdom of crowds”—has its internal defi -
cits and limitations related to the fl attening of beliefs to those which 
are understandable to everyone, and which are often not of the high-
est epistemic quality (Gigone and Hastie 1993, Prijić-Samaržija 2005, 
Prelec, Seung, and McCoy 2017). More succinct, in real-world situa-
tions that we describe as sub-ideal epistemic circumstances, it is dif-
fi cult to expect that public deliberation will automatically generate an 
epistemically valuable or truth-conducive consensus. This is precisely 
why the distinction between ideal and sub-ideal epistemic conditions 
is crucial to understanding my position and the proposal of reliabil-
ity democracy (Goldman 2010). Since we live in sub-optimal epistemic 
conditions, democratic deliberation will not automatically—merely by 
including all citizens in fair procedures—generate epistemic quality. 
What we need is to design democratic processes in such a way to make 
them as reliable as possible, i.e., to make them ensure the highest pos-
sible epistemic quality.
Miščević agrees that the difference between sub-ideal—or real-
world—epistemic circumstances and ideal epistemic circumstances is 
vital for defi ning the division of epistemic labor. While I, within my 
real-world approach, focus on the question of epistemic relationships 
and the division of labor in sub-ideal circumstances to generate de-
cisions of the highest epistemic quality, he suggests we should keep 
this parallelism in mind by assessing sub-ideal epistemic conditions 
as approximates to their ideal theoretic counterpart. While I suggest 
we explore how best to satisfy epistemic norms and which processes of 
dividing epistemic labor generate the highest epistemic quality while 
preserving the democratic rationale, Miščević recommends that we 
“project the notion of rationality downwards” from ideal circumstances 
to sub-ideal circumstances to ascertain how approximate they are to 
their idealized counterpart. Given that, contrary to epistemic proce-
duralism, I maintain the concept of procedure-independent epistemic 
quality (truth-conduciveness), which helps us ascertain whether our 
real and non-ideal circumstances meet specifi c epistemic standards. 
However, I hold that Miščević’s example is excellent theoretical and 
methodological support. While I have attempted to show which aspects 
of the real world muddle epistemic quality, Miščević provides a use-
ful methodological toolkit for establishing the epistemic quality we are 
after: we can imagine an ideal situation as a thought experiment and 
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analyze whether our real circumstances are at all close to ideal. Both 
my empirical (or naturalistic) approach and his rationalist (or norma-
tive) approach could be methodologically benefi cial for attaining more 
epistemic quality.
While we agree that epistemic justifi cation is intrinsic, and while 
we share the same theoretical framework, we diverge on concrete pro-
posals of procedures that would, in sub-ideal circumstances, ensure the 
highest epistemic quality. Simply put, we split on the question of the 
division of labor between citizens and experts. I begin from the attitude 
that, in sub-ideal circumstances, “the wisdom of crowds” will use no in-
visible hand to generate the epistemic quality of beliefs and decisions. 
Instead, we need to ensure it by including experts. My example of the 
division of labor between citizens and experts is as follows: through 
consensus, the procedures of public deliberation, and majority voting, 
citizens defi ne the problem they need resolved and oversee the experts 
by confi rming or rejecting their solutions to the problem. Experts, on 
the other hand, as agents expertly trained to solve problems within 
their area of expertise, seek answers to the suggested issues and pres-
ent them to citizens. It is crucial to note that I think citizens should 
be the ones who will, through consensus, choose the experts they best 
trust to resolve their problems. Here I echo Elizabeth Anderson’s em-
pirical example that citizens with a minimum education and access 
to the Internet can select a trustworthy expert on the topic of, for ex-
ample, global warming (Anderson 2011).
Miščević believes that the division of labor and the decision-making 
process should occur differently. First, he does not think that all citizens 
are capable of defi ning “goals and values” because the limitations—the 
fact they do not fulfi ll the epistemic conditions—that constrain them 
in resolving the detected problems will equally restrict them in defi n-
ing the issues that the experts should address. Second, he beliefs that 
not all citizens, for the same reason, will be capable of detecting reli-
able experts. Instead, they will prefer those who share their stances 
and whose stances they can recognize. For these reasons, Miščević sug-
gests that citizens, within their interest groups, choose experts who 
will represent them in later deliberations where experts will (i) defi ne 
their goals and values, and (ii) best resolve their problems. In other 
words, citizens participate in debate within their groups—class, eth-
nic, gender, religious, or like—where they choose experts who will join 
experts from other—class, ethnic, gender, religious, or like—groups in 
resolving problems. According to Miščević, we can consider a situation 
where the chosen expert representatives from different groups deliber-
ate about which issues should be fi xed and then solve them some kind 
of optimum approximation of the ideal state, because experts are more 
capable of rational debate than citizens, which makes it more likely for 
them to satisfy our epistemic conditions.
Why do I think that Miščević’s example is more expertist than my 
own? First, he reduces civic participation and deliberation between citi-
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zens to the choice of an expert who will (with other experts) assume 
the entire epistemic labor of defi ning the goals, resolving them, and 
overseeing how they are resolved. Miščević seems even more distrust-
ful towards the wisdom of crowds than I am because he believes that 
the epistemic potential of collective intelligence and, in particular, the 
epistemic diversity of perspectives will not be able to generate epis-
temic quality in any aspect other than the choice of representative ex-
perts. Although all citizens are included, their role in decision-making 
is far more limited than in my suggestion, and the part of experts is 
increased. This reduction of civic participation in epistemic labor to the 
selection of representatives is unacceptable for three reasons.
First, the role of citizens in deliberation and decision-making is 
reduced in favor of experts, which upsets the balance between demo-
cratic and epistemic rationale or justifi cation. In my book, I endorse a 
hybrid approach that simultaneously assesses the epistemic and the 
ethical/political justifi cation of processes, practices, and institutions. 
As I have mentioned above, I believe that epistemic instrumentalism, 
which sacrifi ces political goals for epistemic values, is not an appropri-
ate approach. Likewise, I hold that political instrumentalism, where 
epistemic values are sacrifi ced for the political, is equally unacceptable. 
This stance is why I characterize expertism (and its radical form, epis-
tocracy)—the position where experts have the central role in decision-
making—as epistemic instrumentalism. Thus, as my book asserts that, 
in sub-ideal circumstances, there is a structural confl ict between politi-
cal and epistemic values (because the political right to participate does 
not generate decisions of the highest epistemic quality), the hybrid 
model is a conscious and conscientious quest for a balance that main-
tains both political and epistemic values. This binds us to sacrifi ce the 
highest possible epistemic quality to preserve the democratic rationale 
but also to sacrifi ce political values by giving a unique role to experts. 
Miščević’s proposal sacrifi ces political values for the epistemic to the 
extent that disbalances political and epistemic demands and, aiming to 
approximate the ideal of rationality, establishes a stronger expertism 
than I am willing to propose.
Second, I hold that Miščević has overlooked the epistemic potential 
of citizens, focusing on their epistemic defi cits in sub-ideal circumstanc-
es. Just like the collective intelligence of crowds has its defi ciencies, 
individual (expert) intelligence also entails its limitations, which urges 
us to fi nd an appropriate balance or, more succinct, an antidote for 
both defi cits. Since knowledge is dispersed throughout society (Hayek 
1945), “many minds” know little about a lot, while experts know a lot 
about little (R. E. Goodin and K. Spiekermann 2018). There are many 
indicators that collective intelligence—due to cognitive diversity and 
the diversity of perspectives, heuristics, evidence, interpretations, and 
even biases—sometimes generates solutions better than those made 
by individual experts (Goodin 2006, Hong and Page 2004, Landemore 
2013, 2014, Mercier and Sperber 2011, Page 2007, 2008, Zollman 
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2010). Moreover, randomly formed collectives are even more epistemi-
cally successful than structured collectives such as interest groups. Ex-
perts, on the other hand, belong to the homogenous world of the highly 
educated and the materially well off. Miščević attempts to secure the 
condition of diversity in his deliberative groups of experts by stressing 
that they come from different ideological groups, and preserves the de-
sired level of rationality by only including experts.
However, advocates of collective intelligence claim that knowledge 
is dispersed through society, and experts cannot fully satisfy the con-
dition of cognitive diversity. Randomly formed collections of citizens 
ensure a degree of diversity that makes them more reliable truth-
trackers than groups of experts who advocate for different comprehen-
sive doctrines. Keeping this in mind, we need to give citizens space 
where their epistemic advantage of diversity will yield the best epis-
temic results, which is in the areas where there is no highly sophisti-
cated factual knowledge (Zubčić 2020, Janković 2020). This is precisely 
the space I recommend for citizens, who should have a crucial role in 
defi ning goals/problems, choosing the experts who will resolve those 
problems, and conducting a second-order assessment of the consensus 
of trustworthy scientifi c experts (Anderson 2011). In short, citizens’ 
epistemic potential is underestimated and reduced to their choice of 
an ideological representative who will defi ne their problems and then 
resolve them. Unlike Miščević, I can easily imagine that I, as a non-
expert and a citizen, could choose a climatologist who does not belong to 
my ideological group if they could reasonably be tasked with resolving 
the previously defi ned problem of divesting from fossil fuels and tran-
sitioning to renewable resources. I can also imagine myself overseeing 
whether she is appropriately solving this problem. Likewise, I do not 
think anyone would struggle with choosing trustworthy macroecono-
mists, who might not belong to their worldview, if we have previously 
defi ned the issue of increased economic inequality as the problem he 
needs to resolve, nor would they struggle with a second-order assess-
ment of whether the work is done. The role of experts lies in providing 
a technical solution to a problem based on factual knowledge—regard-
less of whether we are talking about science or morals and political 
questions. This is precisely why, in my proposal, all citizens choose 
experts who are not selected as the best representatives of their group 
interests but only as people who can best solve their problem. I believe 
this model preserves both the epistemic potential of the diversity pres-
ent in collective intelligence and the epistemic potential of the factual 
knowledge embodied by individual intelligence.
Third, it is worth asking whether, in Miščević’s division of epistemic 
labor, the chosen experts will be constrained in their representative 
role while making decisions and resolving problems. Namely, I am won-
dering about the condition of being non-dogmatic during deliberation. 
Since they are chosen to advance the group’s interests, their poten-
tial for rational discussion is limited not only by their value judgments 
 S. Prijić-Samaržija, The Epistemic Justifi cation of Democracy 195
but by the fact they need to represent group values. The question is 
whether, in circumstances of disagreement, they are allowed to be open 
towards other experts. Their role is to represent their group’s stances, 
which is why—even if they are, as experts, considerate of rational dis-
course and the strength of evidence—they cannot give up their initial 
stance. Their situation is an illustration of the Steadfast View in the 
debate about disagreement. According to the Steadfast View, the fact 
a peer disagrees with you is irrelevant. Because disagreement, even 
among peers, does not warrant a response, there may thus be cases 
where the uniquely rational response for both parties to a dispute is 
to stick to their initial beliefs (Kelly 2005). In this plot of deliberation 
between representative experts, we can even imagine the Extra Weight 
View, the stance that it is rational to give more weight to your own be-
lief simply because it is yours (Wedgewood 2010). The potential of this 
approach to rationally resolve a disagreement is as small as possible 
and entails some worryingly skeptical conclusions—since both parties 
in deliberation stick to their original beliefs, both p and not-p can be 
considered equally epistemically valuable. In everyday real-world situ-
ations, this means there are no solutions to disagreements, and, thus, 
no solutions to problems. Should we, as Miščević writes, need a solu-
tion to the migrant crisis, representative experts from different groups 
will not be able to suspend their stance and the stance of the group. 
In other words, Miščević’s representative experts do not satisfy the 
epistemic condition of a non-dogmatic approach to deliberation, which 
hampers the epistemic quality of their solutions, decisions, and beliefs. 
An expert chosen by everyone, on the other hand, does not have these 
constraints, and thus, despite all the restraints limiting them as an 
individual epistemic agent, he comes closer to the epistemic conditions 
for generating truth-conducive beliefs/decisions/solutions to problems.
4. Conclusion
In the wake of the culture of ignorance and the crisis of enlighten-
ment, the epistemic justifi cation of democracy as a system that makes 
its decisions through democratic procedures is of utmost importance 
(DeNicola 2017). However, it is equally important not to perceive epis-
temic justifi cation only as a byproduct of fair democratic processes but 
as an intrinsic value related to objective and procedure-independent 
epistemic value, or, more succinct, to truth-conduciveness. In this 
sense, the decision to exclude experts from democratic decision-making 
procedures—a choice we fi nd in epistemic proceduralism as a critique 
of both epistocracy and more moderate forms of expertism—is not only 
unjustifi ed but entails unwanted consequences by increasing distrust 
towards experts and their expertise. We live in a time when citizens 
distrust experts or all the wrong reasons: citizens do not doubt experts 
because they have, as individuals or groups, shown they have not been 
able to solve the citizens’ problems (which is a reason why they indeed 
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should not be granted trust) but because their central virtues of exper-
tise and objective epistemic value have been brought into question.
Today, people distrust experts because they generally do not be-
lieve in expertise, which places us fi rmly within a culture of ignorance. 
This predicament is particularly harmful because the expertise only 
real experts can exercise, and which we need for the epistemic qual-
ity of our decisions/beliefs, cannot be substituted by the fairest and 
the most democratic procedures. For this particular reason, we need 
to reconsider the role of experts in democratic processes and, to en-
sure epistemic quality, make room for real expertise and those experts 
who reliably practice it. However, the part of experts in the division of 
epistemic labor must be appropriately balanced with democratic proce-
dures and civic participation. Experts should present themselves not 
only through truth-revealing situations that paint them as those who 
solve their problems but as responsible professionals. In simpler terms, 
experts must show they are aware of their value limitations, that they 
acknowledge the citizens’ goals and concerns, and that they are non-
dogmatic (meaning, that they are willing to resolve disputes by alter-
ing their position, rather than by sticking to their original stance). To 
craft the best division of epistemic labor, we must acknowledge that 
civic participation is not only the space of the political justifi cation of 
democracy. Instead, it also contributes to epistemic justifi cation, which 
is why we must give citizens a fi tting role in improving the epistemic 
quality of democratic procedures.
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